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“What is real? Whose lives are real? How might
reality be remade? Those who are unreal have, in
a sense, already suffered the violence of
derealization. What, then, is the relation between
violence and those lives considered as ‘unreal’?
Does violence effect that unreality? Does violence
take place on the condition of that unreality?” 
(Judith Butler 2006: 33)
“It is […] easy to be certain; 
one has only to be sufficiently vague.” 
(Charles S. Peirce, CP: 4.237)
“To intervene in the name of transformation
means precisely to disrupt what has become
settled knowledge and knowable reality, and to
use, as it were, one’s unreality to make an
otherwise impossible or illegible claim.” 
(Judith Butler 2004: 27)
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1. Introduction
1 Only a couple of weeks ago it would have been nearly unthinkable to imagine a world in
shutdown-mode because of a pandemic virus.  Yet,  here we are,  in the midst of the
Corona Crisis which – by the time this paper is going to be published – probably still
won’t  be  over,  and  no  one  knows  how  we  are  going  to  deal  with  the  long-term
consequences. We don’t even know yet what those consequences will turn out to be.
Likewise, only a couple of weeks ago, it would have been as unthinkable to imagine that
“iron  certainties,  practices,  rules  and  institutions  can  be  collectively  overturned
together with the habits of our everyday life” (Jaeggi 2020).  Surprisingly, the TINA-
principle (there is no alternative) has been proven wrong. If needed, a big part of world
economics can be put into a state of temporary hibernation. So, common sense has
been shaken in several ways. An article in the New Yorker headlined that the “virus is
rewriting our  imaginations.  What  felt  impossible  has  become thinkable.”  (Robinson
2020).
2 On the other hand, while the media have been dealing for weeks almost exclusively
with the impact of Corona on European and US-American health and economy issues,
the catastrophe of the fugitives in Lesbos, the dying in the Mediterranean Sea, as well
as  other  catastrophes  faded  –  again  –  into  the  background.  Once  again  it  became
obvious that, within the dominant western mainstream, some lives, in the words of
Judith Butler, are less grievable than others. They have become unreal to us, derealized.
Those lives “have, in a sense, already suffered the violence of derealization” (Butler
2006: 33). That, too, is part of the globalized common sense, and this part seems quite
unshaken.  The  acknowledgement  and  adequate  treatment  of  catastrophes  like  the
ongoing refugee crisis seem unimaginable and remain unreal (although we all know,
vaguely, that we could take real action), leading to the suffering and death of thousands
that could be prevented. Reality shows that in these cases, much different from the
Corona crisis, mainstream decided that there is no need to take action. In this sense,
common sense  displays  a  stupendous  degree  of  indifference.1 One  reason  why  this
indifference is  livable  has to do with a  remarkable characteristic  of  common sense
Charles S. Peirce diagnoses: common sense is vague. Applied to the current situation in
Europe, the indifference of the vague common sense blurs the view on the fact that
“the border regime, especially in its catastrophic effects on refugees in camps in Greece
[…]  in  its  current  form  […]  violates  international  law  and  creates  a  permanent
humanitarian catastrophe” (Celikates 2020). Common Sense becomes vague enough to
let facts be reversed in a way that the virus “is ‘othered’ as a foreign threat […] or
‘invasion’,”  while  “borders  seem  like  part  of  the  natural  make-up  of  our  world,
especially for those who are exempt from borders’ daily terror” (ibid.). So, on the one
hand, there are “powerful forces of naturalization that make” political decisions and
power structures appear as natural givens, as an unchangeable reality, while on the
other hand catastrophic realities like the current pandemic are being instrumentalized,
in this case: “othered,” for all kinds of political interests (ibid.). 
3 Common  Sense,  viewed  in  this  light,  is  not  only  vague,  but  also  dangerously
irresponsible.  And  it  becomes  dangerous,  because  the  irresponsibility  is  not  being
perceived  as  such  (better  said:  dimly  perceived  but  not  acknowledged)  due  to  its
vagueness. Instead, the vagueness is veiled through a sense of certainty – another aspect
of  common sense  Peirce  adverts.  However,  as  vague  and certain  as  common sense
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might seem, it still is to be held accountable. As Judith Shklar points out, “we must
recognize that the line of separation between injustice and misfortune is a political
choice, not a simple rule that can be taken as a given” (Shklar 1990: 5). Pointing at the
common  sense  also  means  pointing  at  the  political  responsibility  for  our  self-
understanding, for the line we draw between the alleged unchangeable misfortune of
natural givens and the changeable injustice of political decisions and their underlying
power structures. 
4 Peirce addresses the problem of vague certainty and the illusion of being (self-)critical
in the context of his notion of critical common sense. This pragmatist notion can help
to diagnose power structures in a more encompassing way than discourses, because it
brings out more clearly the non-discursive habitual practices and the own affective
involvement  with  it,  in  this  sense  comparable  to  the  work of  Pierre  Bourdieu.  Put
differently,  with  Antonio  Gramsci,  you  could  say  that  common  sense  answers  the
question:  how do cultural  hegemonic discourses feel like? 2 It  takes into account the
experiential  dimension within those  discourses,  it  emphasizes  the tacit  approval  of
assumptions  and  positions,  it  problematizes  the  consent  with  dominating  power
structures which you incorporate as your own implicit belief-habits – more so, when
they coincidentally work in your favor, but also even if those power structures work
against you. Complementary, if you were to translate post-structural or critical theory
vocabulary into a pragmatist one, you could say that the pragmatist notion of doubting
(as the opposing pole to belief-habits and common sense) describes how the ruptures,
the  shifts  and  deferrals  of  discourse  feel like.  Thereby,  doubting  also  includes  the
experiential aspect of critique, of a critical stance. Thus, neither certainty nor doubt
are to be conceived merely as epistemological matters. Instead, they always encompass
political and moral, and even aesthetic matters.
5 Now, Peirce points at the dilemma between the will to take a critical stance, or to doubt
– “to criticize is ipso facto to doubt” (CP: 5.523) – and the impossibility to criticize or to
doubt at will, because, he claims, you cannot voluntarily doubt your belief-habits and,
on a wider macro-level, the common sense you’re embedded in. We do not doubt what
seems certain to us. In fact, as Peirce states, “if pedantry has not eaten all the reality
out of you, recognize, as you must, that there is much that you do not doubt, in the
least. Now that which you do not at all doubt, you must and do regard as infallible,
absolute truth.” (CP: 5.416). This, however, contradicts deeply one of the achievements
western thinking and democracies, notably since the period of enlightenment, are most
proud of, that is our own capacity and the capacity of our democratic institutions and
our forms of life of (self-)critical thinking. It makes the understanding of ourselves and
our world – namely, our common sense – as being (self-)critical questionable. And this
has to do a lot with vague certainties with respect to what counts as real or unreal. 
6 As Ruth Sonderegger has recently argued, it does not suffice to hold on to a concept of
critique with its long and dubious European tradition (including the co-presence, from
the beginnings, of a willing blindness towards slavery, the uprise of capitalism, etc.),
but to criticize precisely a tradition of self-proclaimed enlightened critique which in its
vagueness remains inconsequential (Sonderegger 2019: 12ff.). This tradition itself has
become part of western self-understanding, it has become part of our common sense.
Hence, the problem to deal with is not only that our capacity to question the given
common sense is limited by our being part of that common sense, but it becomes even
more  complicated  through  the  accompaniment  by  a  vague  certainty  of  being  self-
Vague Certainty, Violent Derealization, Imaginative Doubting
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
3
critical when in fact we aren’t. Then again, this leads to the question: when are we really
entitled to the claim of being self-critical? And which role does the uneven distribution
of that self-entitlement play? Peirce gets to the heart of the issue by writing (thinking
of Kant): “The Critical Philosopher seems to opine that the fact that he has not hitherto
doubted a proposition is no reason why he should not henceforth doubt it. (At which
Common-Sense  whispers  that,  whether  it  be  ‘reason’  or  no,  it  will  be  a  well-nigh
insuperable obstacle to doubt.)” (CP: 5.524). 
7 To make  this  problem tangible  and  to  transform void  forms  of  critique  into  more
powerful  political  practices,  Sonderegger recently proposed a closer examination of
everyday practices, life forms, and habits. In particular, she proposes political practices
of  de-habitualizations  to  overcome  persistent  habits  as  embodiments  of  power
structures. In my view, this is not far away from the pragmatic notion of doubting,
however,  as  I  wish  to  show,  a  re-articulation  as  imaginative  and  other  forms  of
doubting is needed to overcome some shortcomings of the pragmatist, particularly the
Peircian  notion  of  doubt.  This  tendency  in  recent  political  theory  informed  by
(post-)Marxism, critical theory and poststructuralism to address everyday habits and
life forms – apart from the known and valid forms of political struggles – of course
resonates with pragmatist philosophy.3 One important aspect of this strategy is that
good or at least better practices are not being situated in a utopian future, seemingly
forever unattainable for us, but that they start today, here and now. 
8 Last, but not least, all this makes it necessary to problematize the concept of the self
within  our  self-understanding.  As  I  am  going  to  argue,  we  need  to  transform  the
problematic  common  sense  notion  of  the  self by  taking  more  into  account  the
intermediate ground between vague (self-)certainty (as an implicit result of belief-habits)
and states of (self-)doubting and (self-)critique, which the pragmatist, particularly the
Peirceian model of the self tends to neglect. Apart from the fact that, for the majority
of the world’s population, (self-)certainty represents a luxurious state of mind they
could only dream of, we have to ask in how far this comfortable position of certainty
can only be maintained by some at the expense of a destabilized vast world majority
and  the  corresponding  indifference  toward  that  fact.  This  is  the  question  Butler
examines (her focus is not on certainty, but as we will see, her theory is applicable to
this problem). Put in psychoanalytic terms, one could say that vague certainty is only
sustainable through a repression of the uncertain and a projection of that repressed
uncertainty onto others;  that the seemingly high reality level  of  ascertained belief-
habits  can  only  be  maintained  by  derealizing  others.  Thus,  to  counter  that,  a
derealization  of certainty  needs  to  go  hand  in  hand  with  a  rerealization  of  those
derealized. As I propose, imaginative and other forms of doubting are viable candidates
for this process, because they make the intermediate ground between the seemingly
real (and certain) and the unreal (and uncertain) experienceable. Also, as I will argue,
doubting is not reducible to an uncomfortable, but nevertheless necessary evil to be left
behind rapidly by new belief-habits and certainties. Instead, it describes an instable yet
empowering site of contestation in between the unsettling and resettling of the self
and, thereby, of common sense. But, this is an important distinction to be drawn, it is
only  empowering  by  being  clearly  distinguished  from  its  violent  kindred  such  as
shame,  guilt,  and  self-hatred.  There  is  even  an  aesthetic  component  in  doubting
(Salaverría 2012,  2014,  2017).  From a perspective of self-certainty,  this might sound
absurd. But imaginative doubting points precisely at a different notion of subjectivity,
conceived as, speaking with Jacques Rancière, a subjectivation that tries to distance
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itself  from  the  common  sense  as  a  false  consent  –  including  the  phantasm  of
unassailable individualist self-certainty. 
9 In what follows, first I am going to discuss Peirce’s notion of common sense and vague
certainty,  distinguishing two different  kinds  of  certainty,  the  latter  of  which being
related  to  Bourdieu’s  notion  of  distinction,  showing  that  they  accordingly  require
different types of doubting and a closer connection to creative processes of abduction,
thereby overcoming a tension within Peirce’s notion of the self. Secondly, I am going to
discuss different forms of doubting as a way to counter derealization, as the opposing
pole  to  vague  certainties  in  the  light  of  a  contemporary  discussion  of  political
movements, violence, and grievability. Also, I am going to show why and how a specific
understanding of imaginative doubting forms part of political critique and practices. It
contains both a painful element in that it involves “removal from the naturalness of a
place,” while at the same time enabling “the opening up of a subject where anyone can
be counted since it is the space where those of no account are counted” (Rancière 1999:
36).  The  aesthetic  element  consists  furthermore  in  that  imaginative  doubting
temporarily  unsettles  the  consent  on  what  Rancière  calls  the  “partition  of  the
sensible,” with Peirce’s vocabulary: the common sense which hinders us to perceive
those outside the common sense. So, on the one hand, Peirce maintains a notion of
common sense reality, but on the other hand, as I am going to show, he maintains a
deeply ambiguous notion of the self  and its (self-)critical capacities.  The concept of
critical common sense, applied to the present with a modified notion of doubting, can
provide an intermediate alternative to both a too hopeless position as in Theodor W.
Adorno’s  disputed declaration of “total  social  delusion” (Adorno 1974:  206)  and the
devastating phantasm – rightly attacked by Peirce, Adorno, Butler and others – of an
unassailable individualism. 
 
2. Critical Common Sense, Forms of Certainty 
10 Peirce’s notion of the critical common sense (a notion he coins in his later work) is a
useful tool to deal with a major unresolved conflict of western self-understanding: the
idea of being (self-)critical, when this idea itself is part of a common sense disabling the
critique of that what it intends to do. The concept of critical common sense points at
the  danger  of  critical  thinking  to  oversee  its  own  partial  blindness  and  to  be  too
comfortable  within  the  own  alleged  critical  position  when  instead  it  stabilizes
injustices. 
11 As  we  know,  Peirce  links  this  critique  of  the  critique  to  the  famous  pragmatist
pendulum of doubt and belief  he developed – deepened, modified,  and enriched by
William James,  John Dewey, and others.  We are convinced of something unless this
belief is  being disrupted by a doubt.  Now, as already mentioned, he claims that we
cannot  choose  to  doubt.  To  do  so,  as  he  holds  against  this  voluntarist  tendency  in
Descartes, would merely be “paper doubts” (CP: 5.514), objecting the idea to be able to
decide willingly when and what to doubt. At least, we “cannot begin with complete
doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have.” (CP: 5.265). The
crucial point he makes is that these “prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim,” as
he holds against Kant and, more generally, against an overestimation of reason, “for
they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned […]. Hence this initial
skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows
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the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those
beliefs  which in form he has  given up.”  (CP:  5.265).  We have a  strong tendency to
maintain those positions we believe in. This is so because, in Peirce’s view, doubt “is an
uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the
state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to
avoid” (CP: 5.372).
12 Still, Peirce locates himself in between Kant and the Scottish common sense realism of
Thomas Reid. With Reid, he problematizes the possibility of being able to exert control
over the choice and range of critique – limited by the vague common sense, understood
as some macro-belief-instinct of humanity or of a given society, which stabilizes our
sense of reality.4 With Kant, he holds on to the necessity to articulate critique.
13 Peirce’s concept of reality is complex and contested. Suffice it to say in this context
that he vehemently rejects the Kantian notion of the Ding-an-Sich, in other words, we
have no “conception of the absolutely incognizable” (CP: 5.265). Instead, he defends a
robust common sense realism (CP: 5.312), an understanding of a common sense reality
based on an indefinite past (partly constituted through micro-and macro-habits). At
the same time, he believes in the “real possibility” (CP: 5.453) of a more complete and
definite understanding of reality in the future which we might get closer to as human
community  –  especially  through  the  community  of  investigators  and  the  scientific
method. That, as Peirce hoped, would help to overcome other, more limited methods for
the fixation of beliefs (which he labels as methods of tenacity, authority, and a priori) (CP:
5.316).
14 Interestingly, this leads Peirce to the conclusion that the individual is rather unreal. He
asks: “And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have
had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected
ourselves.” (CP: 5.311; emphasis H.S.). For Peirce, to “make single individuals absolute
judges of truth is most pernicious,” as the “individual man, since his separate existence
is  manifested only by ignorance and error,  so far  as  he is  anything apart  from his
fellows […], is only a negation” (CP: 5.317). “The real, then,” Peirce concludes, “is that
which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is
therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you” (CP: 5.311). So, this position is
radically opposed to the (Peircian version of) Cartesianism, that “the ultimate test of
certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness” (CP: 5.264).
15 Within his theory, habits are on a micro-level what the critical common sense is on a
macro-level:  Modifications take place in the space of vagueness (which for Peirce is
real, too) common sense leaves, or, as Dewey later put it: “Thinking is secreted in the
interstices of habits.” (Dewey 1984: 335). So, while vague certainty paralyses critique,
there is potential in the vaguely uncertain, as there are “real vagues, and especially real
possibility” (CP: 5.453). But how is this possible if “there are some propositions that a
man, as a fact, does not doubt; and what he does not doubt, he can, at most, make but a
futile pretense to criticize” (EP2: 432-3)?
16 The vagueness of common sense contains at least two problems: it is difficult to grasp
and it is very comfortable. It is difficult to grasp because, as a kind of a macro-habit, it
has converted into second nature shared by many, being naturalized to a degree where
it becomes almost invisible. It is comfortable because it brings about certainty which is
accompanied by a feeling of complacency. “Dismiss make-believes Philosophers of very
diverse stripes propose that philosophy shall take its start from one or another state of
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mind in which no man, least of all  a beginner in philosophy, actually is.  […] But in
truth, there is but one state of mind from which you can ‘set out,’ namely, the very
state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do ‘set out’ – a state in
which you are laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you
cannot divest yourself if you would.” (EP: 2.336).
17 On the other hand, Peirce contends that a “person may, it is true, in the course of his
studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts
because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let
us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.” (CP: 5.265).
The distinction drawn here between self-deceptive and real heart-felt doubt is that you
find a positive reason to doubt. This positive reason, and for that matter the real doubt,
has  to  do  with  what  Peirce  calls  within  his  system  of  categories  secondness:  an
experiential  confrontation,  for example a conflict  or a  surprise.  “The breaking of  a
belief can only be due to some novel experience.” (CP: 5.524). Clearly, this is not the
case when you experience certainty. For further clarification, two kinds of certainty
need to be distinguished.5 
18 The  first  kind  is  the  one  Peirce  focuses  on  as  vague  everyday  certainty  which
constitutes our common-sense belief-habits or, in the words of Ludwig Wittgenstein
who  describes  certainty  similarly,  our  forms  of  life.  They  ground  our  claims  to
knowledge. Peirce calls them “acritical” (CP: 5.440). As Christopher Hookway puts it, we
“do not know why we believe these things;  we cannot imagine being able to doubt
them; and they have a foundational role for our practices of inquiry and justification”
(Hookway 2002: 150). Certainty, in this sense, is not the aim of our endeavors, but the
basis from which we stem, in which we are always embedded. These kind of common
sense  certainties  include  vague  assumptions  of  the  sort  that  “there  is  an  order  in
nature, or that I will be the same person tomorrow that I am today” (CP: 5.265).
19 However, taking up again the example of the current Corona crisis, one can see how
quickly even those most basic and uncontested certainties can become dubitable. So,
one could assume it might turn out that we are responsible for this pandemic (there
has been shown a correlation between past epidemics and factory farming, as in the
bird and swine flu). One might then conclude that we are dealing with a human-made
disaster, which disturbed the not human-made given order of nature. Even then, one
could wonder how stable the belief in the reliability of that order remains. If not, one
surely will start to wonder how it is possible that the globalized world is being turned
upside down by a virus. And even if we know that epidemics and pandemics happened
before, the certainty will be shaken. 
20 One might counter that this argument is not valid as it is mixing up the logical and the
political; that Peirce aimed at pointing out that we cannot doubt in principle as long as
there isn’t  a basis of  vague common sense certainties on which we stand. Common
Sense certainties and confidence represent the form of life or frame or background
assumptions  necessary  to  doubt  in  the  first  place  (Tiercelin  2016:  187).  Hence,  one
shouldn’t conflate acritical common sense certainties and prejudices or common belief-
habits.  However,  as  Claudine  Tiercelin  underscores  comparing  Wittgenstein’s  and
Peirce’s  notion  of  certainty,  the  “epistemic  status  of  such  ungrounded  beliefs”  is
difficult  to  determine:  Are  those  “unearned certainties”  (Wright  2004:  38;  Tiercelin
2016: 191) logical truths, propositions (if interpreted as descriptions instead of norms),
analytic  rules,  principles,  norms?  Many  agree  on  the  conclusion  that  they  have  a
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“hybrid status” (Tiercelin 2016: 191). And, in the light of political and ethical issues, one
should ask if  our “failure to doubt these propositions ‘in our hearts’  may reveal the
weakness of our epistemic characters rather than the superior epistemical authority of
our ‘hearts’” (Hookway 2002: 248).6 Also, we shouldn’t forget that, for Peirce, “he who
would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical
in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle” or “based upon
ethics”  (CP:  2.654,  5.533).  Now,  there  is  a  tension  for  one  thing  between  Peirce’s
emphasis on common sense, vague certainties and beliefs and, then again, his emphasis
on critique –  as  it  is  not  the case that  critical  common sense regards itself  as  less
critical  than  the  critical  philosophers  (namely  Kant),  but  on  the  contrary  as  more
critical. The critical commonsensist “feels that the danger […] does not lie in believing
too little but in believing too much” (CP: 5.451, 5.523, 5.517; Tiercelin 2016: 195). In this
sense,  critical  common  sense  is  a  posture  in  which  you  acknowledge  the  danger  of
believing things although they are not warranted. And even if Peirce surely wouldn’t have
agreed  with  Richard  Rorty’s  philosophical  prospect,  he  might  have  agreed  that
“solidarity is based on a sense of a common danger, not on a common possession or a
shared power” (Rorty 1989: 91). 
21 With  that  in  mind,  Peirce’s  stating  the  existence  of  vague  certainties  should  be
understood more as a critical diagnosis than as an affirmation. It is a way to dismantle
the illusion of being capable of criticizing all we wish to (while simultaneously wishing
that  this  capacity  won’t  trouble  our  certainty-comfort).  This  is  the important
distinction Peirce draws between critical  and uncritical  common sense.  The critical
common sense he defends “criticizes the critical method, follows its footsteps, tracks it
to its lair” (CP: 5.523). Isn’t it striking that this somewhat merciless hunt Peirce depicts
does not address the uncritical common sense but the critical method, for not being as
critical as it presumes? Peirce attacks the false critique of the critical thinker and less the
unreflective  common  sense,  which  has  less  tools  and,  in  a  way,  is  more  innocent,
because it simply doesn’t know better. In another way, however, this kind of common
sense certainty could be related to his method of tenacity – “the instinctive dislike of an
undecided  state  of  mind,  exaggerated  into  a  vague  dread  of  doubt”  (CP:  5.377).  A
position, which, as we can see until today, is dangerous and violent, but needs to be
tackled differently than the critical philosopher who acts “as if doubting were ‘as easy
as lying’” (CP: 5.416). 
22 This has to do with the second way of understanding certainty: as (self-)certainty – not
as the underlying ground of our thinking and acting, but as its purpose. Pinnacling
Dewey’s famous quest for certainty, one could speak of a will to certainty or even a self-
proclaimed right to (self-)certainty. Let’s put it like this: we don’t need to worry about
scarcity of certainty. Rather, it seems that there is an entropic process at work which
leads, if we don’t actively work against it, towards vague (self-)certainty. Interpreted
this way, certainty could be compared to laziness. If, for example, I don’t actively do
physical exercise, I will remain physically passive and inactive. I don’t have to worry
that  I  will  not  rest,  except  in  cases  of  workaholic,  anorectic,  or  self-optimizational
pathologies (which are real  problems,  though, having to do again with internalized
mechanisms of self-punishment). I should worry more about the workout than about
the resting. Or, you could compare it to cleaning your apartment. I don’t have to worry
about the dust never returning. It will. Self-certainty is comparable to laziness or dust.
It  is  entropic.  If  you don’t  do anything,  it  will  grow. And,  forgive me this  polemic,
precisely as (seemingly) agreeable and comfortable as laziness is the a priori method –
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from Peirce’s point of view, of course. It is “agreeable to reason” in that it is not led by
experience but by its inclinations, something which can be seen particularly, for Peirce,
in the “history of metaphysical philosophy,” but as well, e.g., in the dubious “doctrine
that  man  only  acts  selfishly”  (CP:  5.382).  It  is  “distinguished  for  its  comfortable
conclusions” and includes “certain flatteries to the vanity of man” (CP: 5.386). 
23 But his critique of the a priori method not only consists in detecting the problem that
inquiry becomes “something similar to the development of taste,” but also in that it
“does not differ in a very essential way from the [method] of authority” (CP: 5.383). And
this is something which comes quite close to what French thinkers like Michel Foucault
and  Pierre  Bourdieu  diagnosed  in  great  detail  much  later  (paved  by  Friedrich
Nietzsche’s  Genealogy  of  Morals),  namely  the  internalization  of  external  force.  “The
government,”  Peirce  writes,  “may  not  have  lifted  its  finger  to  influence  my
convictions” (CP: 5.383). But still  I  will  be influenced by the doctrines of society, or
should we say with Peirce: by common sense. The “persecution does not all come from
without;  but  a  man  torments  himself  and  is  oftentimes  most  distressed  at  finding
himself believing propositions which he has been brought up to regard with aversion”
(CP: 5.386). Seen in this light, the self-certainties of the a priori method help stabilizing
power  structures  by  making  violent  practices  of  exclusion  seem  unconstrained  for
some  while  leaving  others  “tormented  and  distressed”  in  self-punishment  –  and
therefore fearing doubts. 
24 Applied to the present, one could describe this kind of self-certainty with Bourdieu as a
tool of distinction representing an implicit power which will grow entropically for the
privileged if they don’t actively work against it, and as a production of self-uncertainty
for those less privileged. Bourdieu criticizes the distinguished taste of the upper classes
for the fact that their refined aesthetic judgements both reinforce and conceal the class
differences  on  which  they  are  based.  In  a  similar  way  as  monarchies  were  once
legitimized  by  the  divine  right  of  God,  a  specific  understanding  of  transcendental
capacities – in the form of (aesthetic) autonomy that is particularly developed among
the upper classes – serves to legitimize their economic privileges. And it is precisely
this distorted understanding of autonomy (Peirce’s a priori method) which leads to false
self-certainty. It works as a “manner of using symbolic goods, especially those regarded
as the attributes of excellence,” which constitute “one of the key markers of ‘class’ and
also the ideal weapon in strategies of distinction.” One could say that the bourgeois
common  sense  has  been  naturalized  from  early  childhood  on  as  “imperceptible
learning”  that  leads  to  a  feeling  of  self-certainty  marking  the  difference  to  lower
classes.  “It confers the self-certainty which accompanies the certainty of possessing
cultural  legitimacy,  and  the  ease  which  is  the  touchstone  of  excellence  […]  which
bourgeois families hand down to their offspring as if it were a heirloom.” (Bourdieu
1984: 66). Distinction appears free and autonomous when in fact it is based on processes
of exclusion, which are further reinforced by it. 
25 Self-certainty, understood this way, is therefore not a neutral epistemological matter,
but an ethical-political question of securing distinction, which stabilizes one’s power. It
is  accompanied by a tacitly assumed right to self-certainty,  which Rorty gets to the
heart of it by diagnosing his own positioning in society. “In our society, straight white
males  of  my generation –  even earnestly  egalitarian straight  white  males  –  cannot
easily stop themselves from feeling guilty relief that they were not born women, or gay
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or black, any more than they can stop themselves from being glad that they were not
born mentally retarded or schizophrenic.” (Rorty 1998: 224).
26 The difference between both kinds of certainty is that the first one, described as the
everyday certainty, is based more in common sense, that is,  in a vague mainstream
understanding  of  the  world,  while  the  second  kind  of  certainty,  the  self-certainty,
works more along the lines of exclusiveness, distinction, and thereby, the exclusion of
others. Of course, both forms can and do overlap. The best way to distinguish them is
along the intersectional lines of class differences, sexism and racism. A white German
from  a  lower  class  probably  will  have  some  common  sense  certainties  including
prejudices  towards  blacks,  women,  gays,  etc.  He  will  share  some  of  those  vague
certainties with an upper class white man, while at the same time feeling insecure and
inferior with regard to his intellectual status, a feeling which tends to be transformed
into  aggressive  resentments,  preferentially  being  split  off  and  projected  onto
marginalized groups. The self-certainty (comfortably blurring structures of exclusion)
thrives on exclusivity and decorates itself with the trophy of being (self-)critical, using
it as a tool of distinction, fading out what (self-)critical thinking was intended to be –
not aimed at the fortification of one’s own status and position, but to take into account
others, particularly those vulnerabalized precisely by resentments on the one hand and
structures of distinction and exclusion on the other. From this point of view, the vague
common  sense  certainties  for  somebody  from  a  lower  class  will  be  different  from
someone from an upper class. 
 
3. Forms of Doubting
27 Analogously, the doubts needed to disrupt their corresponding certainties will and need
to  be  different  depending  on  where  you  stand  in  society.  So,  we  are  not  talking  about
(merely)  epistemological  but  practical  and  aesthetic  certainties.  Correspondingly,
doubting  needs  to  take  into  account  all  these  fields.  Rorty  once  has  been  sharply
criticized for his figure of the liberal ironist who constantly and radically doubts her
own position.  Later  on,  he conceded that  his  characterization had been wrong and
exaggerated, because it would lead to an unrealistic and unlivable skepticism, for that
matter incompatible with pragmatist fallibilism (Rorty 1989: 73; 2010: 506; Salaverría
2020).  True,  it  is  an almost unlivable position – which makes it  even worse,  as  the
position  of  unceasingly  doubting  the  legitimacy  of  your  own position  represents  a
painful  reality  for  many  people.  However,  what  they  are  dealing  with  is  neither
skepticism nor a productive doubt leading to inquiry, but a self-destructive self-doubt
inseparable from feelings of shame, guilt and self-hatred. It is the embodiment of the
real and structural violence (exclusion and deprecation) which has been inflicted upon
you, until it became a habit, forming a marginalized second-class common-sense. More
than doubting,  it  is  internalized humiliation.  But if  you want to call  it  doubting,  it
should be specified as authoritarian self-doubts. 
28 In  2018,  the  Tasmanian  comedian  Hannah  Gadsby  became  famous  for  her  comedy
special “Nanette,” in which she describes her struggles as an autist lesbian comedian
and announces to quit comedy, at least the way she had done it before: “I built a career
out of self-deprecating humor. […] And I don’t want to do that anymore. Because, do
you  understand  what  self-deprecation  means  when  it  comes  from  someone  who
already exists in the margins? It’s not humility, it’s humiliation. I put myself down in
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order to speak, in order to seek permission to speak. And I will  simply not do that
anymore,  not  to  myself  or  anybody  who  identifies  with  me.”  (Gadsby  2018).  To
overcome  that  vague  common  sense  of  the  margins,  you  need  a  different  kind  of
doubting,  one  I  propose  to  call  anti-authoritative  doubting.  It  is  an  angry  form  of
doubting,  in  which  you  question  your  internalized  authorities  which  stabilize  the
dynamic of self-deprecation, but without reproducing the violence inflicted upon you.
For that, you need others: an audience, accomplices, a political movement. 
29 Black Lives Matter (BLM), for example, was founded in 2013 in response to the acquittal
of Trayvon Martin’s murderer. It originally spread through social media initiated by
Alicia  Garza,  Patrisse  Cullors,  and  Opal  Tometi,  later  expanded  into  a  global
organization. Its “mission is to eradicate white supremacy and build local power to
intervene in violence inflicted on Black communities by the state and vigilantes. By
combating and countering acts of violence, creating space for Black imagination and
innovation, and centering Black joy, we are winning immediate improvements in our
lives.”7 It gained even more international attention after the killing of George Floyd this
year.  It  also is  an important movement of  empowerment rejecting the centuries  of
slavery and racism archived in transgenerational trauma not only of ongoing inflicted
real violence and systemic racism, but also of internalized authoritarian self-doubts. The
Me Too movement is another example. In 2017, it started to spread as well through social
media: women who had kept silent for years out of shame, blaming themselves for the
violence they experienced, finally found their voices and could partly overcome the
destructive self-doubts through anti-authoritarian doubting. One important aspect is to
perceive and to recognize that you are not alone (remember what Peirce says about the
individual). Through the shared experience and the public appearance, the derealized
humiliation is turned actively into anti-authoritarian doubts and transformed into a re-
realisation of the own position, in that it makes it possible to hold those inflicting the
derealization, at least partly, accountable. It enables a shared mourning of the lost lives
and  the  lost  reality  through  a violence  which  makes  those marginalized  through
derealization ungrievable. Furthermore, what connects people and generates political
movements, is the same shared anti-authoritarian doubt, which includes anger, mourning,
hope. Particularly the releasing realization that the own self-blame – the authoritarian
doubt, beforehand considered too shameful to share, because it had been attributed to
private, individual failure, becomes a publicly and politically perceivable problem. It is
being shifted into the political  arena,  where it  belongs.  “To counter the scheme of
lethal phantasmagoria […] a new imaginary is required – an egalitarian imaginary that
apprehends the interdependency of lives […]. It is possibly a way of bringing another
reality into being […]. The ‘unrealism’ of such an imaginary is its strength.” (Butler
2020: 203). The process of anti-authoritarian doubting consists in allowing that reality
of self-blame to be traced back to its external infliction; subsequently, it leads to the
realization  that  it  is  an  imposed reality,  not  owned  by  yourself;  followed  by  the
derealization  of  that  imposed  reality  through  externalization  and  protesting  the
structural violence of that given common sense. A process in which the structurally
projected and effectively inflicted violence on marginalized groups is being rejected
and  returned  to  sender  through  protests  –  senders  who  outsourced  their  own
uncertainties in order to perpetuate their fiction of vague self-certainty at the expense
of others. As Butler puts it in the context of murderous violence against PoC in the US:
“The practices of public mourning and political demonstration converge: when lives
are considered ungrievable, to grieve them openly is protest. So when people assemble
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in the street, arrive at rallies or vigils, demonstrate with the aim of opposing this form
of racist violence, they are ‘speaking back’ to this mode of address, insisting on what
should be obvious but is not, namely, that these lost lives are unacceptable losses.”
(Butler & Yancy 2015). Vague common sense certainties as well as comfortable self-
certainty claim an alleged existing universalism, the “norm of whiteness that supports
both violence and inequality insinuates itself into the normal and the obvious” (ibid.).
This  common sense  norm is  being  dismantled,  producing  uncertainty  towards  that
belief-habit, thereby making it concretely graspable in its failure but also in its possible
amelioration. But this presupposes an acknowledgement of those failures, a taking of
responsibility and questioning privileges. When this is being negated, the reaction is
anger and more violence on the side of the senders whose undelivered message has
been returned to them. 
30 In the case of Black Lives Matter (BLM),  not few whites in the US started to react by
wanting to correct the name of the movement into All Lives Matter.  In 2015, Senator
Rand Paul stated the BLM movement would focus on the “wrong targets,” and that they
should change their name “maybe – if they were All Lives Matter, or Innocent Lives
Matter” (Marino 2015). Apart from the condescending tone suggesting that it were up
to him to grant the movement permission and recognition (“maybe, if they were…”),
the proposal to rename it into Innocent Lives Matter implies that the problem with the
name BLM consist in wrongly including non-innocent, in other words: “guilty” blacks,
suggesting that they themselves might have provoked being killed by police, implicitly
blaming them for the violence inflicted upon them and indirectly legitimizing police
violence against blacks. The same line of argument is being used against women who
experience sexual violence, claiming they provoked that violence themselves. Others
like Donald Trump stated that BLM is a divisive and racist movement – an absurd and
reversed tit for tat, as in fact the division is caused by structural racism of the US state
and  the  police.  The  BLM movement  is  a  reaction  against  that  racism  and  division,
externalizing  symbolically  the  formerly  internalized  violence,  returning  it  to  the
sender, which Trump again tries to return back. As we have seen recently with the
protests following the violent death of George Floyd: the refusal to hold still  as the
recipient  of  violence,  instead  mirroring  back  symbolically  that  violence  through
protests  (most  of  which  have  been  peaceful,  even  though  rage  is  more  than
understandable) produces anger in those who are not willing to step back from their
white privileges. (There is a countermovement called Blue Lives Matter which advocates
killing law enforcement officers should be sentenced under hate crime statutes, and of
course  there  are  white  supremacists  promoting  right  away  the  slogan  White  Lives
Matter.)  How far people are willing to go to retain their privileges and not to allow
change could be seen by Trump’s reaction to the recent protests this year when he
tweeted: “When the looting starts,  the shooting starts,”  a  quote from Miami police
chief’s notorious 1967 “declaration of war” after refusing to establish communication
with Miami’s black community, which led to massive upheavals (Rosenwald 2020). 
31 So, one strategy to deny the acknowledgement of the reality of the protesters and of
those already killed is to invoke a vague universalism seemingly (self-)critical and to
dismiss the protests as irrational and unjustly foreclosing that shared universalism. It is
an  intent  to  blur  the  political  claims  of  African  Americans  back  into  some  vague
common sense,  a caricature of universalism which would continue to exclude them
from that universalism. The other strategy is to create a climate of fear as Trump is
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currently  doing  by  directly  threatening  the  movement  with  military  intervention,
legitimized by his assessment they were terrorists.
32 In 1962, James Baldwin writes that “a vast amount of the energy that goes into what we
call  the  Negro  problem is  produced by  the  white  man’s  profound desire  not  to  be
judged by those who are not white, not to be seen as he is, and at the same time a vast
amount of the white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be
seen as he is, to be released from the tyranny of his mirror” (Baldwin 1962). But the
latter makes a different kind of doubting necessary, which I am going to talk about
now. 
33 After the distinctions of various forms of doubting I proposed so far, Peirce’s notion of
doubting seems, paradoxically, somehow vague, or examined more closely, seems to
contain  almost  irreconcilable  elements.  So,  he  speaks  of  surprise  which  is
unconstrained,  but  doubts  also  are  part  of  experiences  of  actuality  (what  he  calls
secondness), and “when I feel the sheriffs’s hand on my shoulder, I shall begin to have a
sense  of  actuality.  Actuality  is  something  brute.”  (CP:  1.24).  Then  again,  another
important element he mentions is the social impulse. Laying out in the Fixation of Belief
the different methods to establish a belief, Peirce writes (in the context of the method of
authority)  that “some individuals […] possess a wider sort of social  feeling […],  they
cannot help seeing that it is a mere accident of their being taught as they have.” They
cannot “resist the reflection that there is no reason to rate their own views at a higher
value than those of other nations and other countries; thus giving rise to doubts in
their minds” (CP: 5.381). The experience of those individuals is quite different from a
brute actuality or a surprise. It is more of a susceptibility for the suffering of others.
This point is  being underscored by an important footnote Peirce added 1903 to the
Fixation of Belief, in which he modifies his claim that “when doubt ceases, mental action
on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without a purpose” (CP:
5.376). And that important addition is that there is one exception, namely “that of self-
criticism. Insert here a section upon self-control and the analogy between Moral and
Rational self-control.” (CP: 5.376 FN P2 p. 233). And if “to criticize is ipso facto to doubt”
(CP:  5.523),  then  self-criticism  entails  self-doubts,  or,  as  I  propose  to  call  it:
acknowledging self-doubts.
34 To understand better what Peirce has in mind, we have to take a look at his concept of
self-control and of the self, which is deeply ambiguous (Salaverría 2007: 61-83). Some
scholars like Richard Bernstein see a “serious incoherence in what Peirce says about
the  self.  The  nature  of  human  individuality  seemed  to  be  a  source  of  intellectual
embarrassment  for  Peirce.”  (Bernstein  1971:  198).  Instead,  others  see  potential  in
Peirce’s  concept.  Vincent  Colapietro  underscores  its  importance  to  “acknowledge
reflectively  the  paradox  of  autonomy,  the  extent  to  which  mastery  over  the  self
involves a series of surrenders to what is other than the self” (Colapietro 2006: 183). In
the  context  of  this  paper,  Peirce’s  concept  is  fruitful  precisely  because of  its  inner
unresolved tensions, which still reflect, at least partly, our current common sense and
can  thereby  help  to  reveal  underlying  structures  (which  can  be  interpreted  as  a
historical diagnosis).
35 The main tension within Peirce’s concept of the self is that he conceives of it, as we
already saw, as intrinsically negative, he even writes that “individualism and falsity are
one and the same,” that the individual is unreal, because it is “not whole as long as he is
single,” that “one man’s experience is nothing if it stands alone. If he sees what others
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cannot, we call it hallucination.” (CP: 5.402). In other words: without others, the self’s
experience is nothing, unreal. Now, it is one thing to concede – in my view: correctly so
– the dependence of the self and its reality on others. Interestingly, Colapietro refers to
Butler’s analysis of the paradox of autonomy which he also sees at works in Peirce’s
concept of the self, when he writes that “I am able to give laws to myself only to the
extent […] that I am always already given over to others and, as a consequence of this,
given to myself not only by others but also in terms inherited and authorized by these
others. […] The roots of autonomy are to be traced to heteronomy.” (Colapietro 2006:
183). However, it is another thing to describe the development of the self in terms of
sin and self-reproach. But for Peirce, self-control and self-reproach “seem to be the
fundamental characteristics which distinguish a rational being. Blame, in every case,
appears a modification, often accomplished by a transference, or a ‘projection’ of the
primary feeling of self-reproach.” (CP: 5.418-19).8 In several instances Peirce describes
humans as sinners and urges to acknowledge this fact to overcome self-righteousness
(CP: 5.583).  Peirce  was  a  child  of  his  time and his  position is  that  of  a  “christened
contrite fallibilism” (CP: 1.14; Colapietro 2006: 198). 
36 Now, the problem does not consist in the critique of hubris and self-righteousness, but
in  the  method  Peirce  advocates  to  overcome  it,  which  would  be  authoritarian  self-
doubting,  for it  surrenders to a higher (in this case: religious) authority which itself
remains unquestioned. To be clear, the problem with authoritarian doubting doesn’t lie
in faith, but in inherent structural violence leading to shame, guilt and self-hatred –
which  aren’t  good  advisors.  One  can  see  the  problem  evidently  with  religious
fundamentalists who identify with the alleged absolutely certain authority to outsource
their own uncertainty. In order to maintain their fantasy of self-righteous-certainty,
the feeling of self-reproach is being transferred and projected onto others as blame
(Peirce  himself  writes  about),  furthermore  it  is  accompanied  by  the  feeling  of
entitlement to exert violence over others. There is a deeper societal level in this which
is highly problematic,  for fundamentalism instrumentalizes faith for its own will  to
power: It is the internalization of questionable commandments partitioning the world
into good and evil, ascribing the evil e.g. to the body, to blacks, to women, to women’s
bodies, to black women’s bodies, etc. That is, a specific historical common sense veiled
as  an  indubitable  authority  is  being  used  to  reproduce  structures  of  violence  and
exclusion. It works just as well without abusing religion. It seems as if Peirce considered
the  tenacious  self-righteousness  –  or  the  self-certainty  –  as  so  intransigent  that  it
needed a  proper  dose  of  punitive  self-reproach to  be  overcome.  As  a  consequence,
unfortunately, the baby is being thrown out with the bathwater. Or, to use a different
metaphor, self-righteousness and self-reproach simply are opposite sides of the same
coin. It is strange that Peirce underlines so much the uncomfortableness of doubting to
then replace it with self-flagellating self-reproach and severe self-criticism as a more
viable option. How could he think that people would choose that path if they hang on
so  much  on  beliefs  and  certainty?  Even  more  so  as  he  took  into  account  the
mechanisms of projection and transference? If self-certainty is built on violence and
structural  indifference  towards  others,  then  self-reproach  will  only  reproduce  that
violence. The reasonable dose to set against erroneous beliefs and certainties therefore
is  not  a  more violent,  but  a  less violent  form of  doubting which I  propose to name
acknowledging doubting. It is a form of doubting which acknowledges its entanglement
with violent power structures without (re-)producing new ones. If, for example, you
want  to  acknowledge  your  own  structural  racism,  it  doesn’t  help  to  self-reproach
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yourself as a guilty sinner or an evil-doer. Guilt, that you can learn from Nietzsche,
revolves around itself. In that, it remains egotistical. Instead, what is needed, is a sense
of radical responsibility that takes into account others by really listening to them, by
doubting your own self-certainty, thereby overcoming a model of the unassailable self,
which in itself not only is problematic but also limiting the potential complexity and joy of
the self. This kind of responsibility not only frees from authoritarian doubting and its
adhered false notion of the self, thereby freeing the self itself from its limiting self-
image. It also enables oneself to open up to new experiences, beforehand ignored. If,
however, you are caught in self-reproach, you won’t be able to perceive other, more
complex  and  joyful  options,  because  you  are  too  busy  dealing  with  your  guilt.
Acknowledging doubts, instead, are free of self-punishment and shame, they come with
mourning and responsibility: Mourning the loss of your erroneous certainties, but also
mourning what the practices of exclusion you formed part of did to others. Therein lies
beauty.
37 At first sight surprisingly, Peirce unfolds the concept of self-control and self-reproach
in conjunction with moral and aesthetic ideals. But as far as I can see, there remains a
problematic gap in between Peirce’s diagnostic description of the painful experience of
doubting or, for that matter, self-reproach on the one hand, and of the therapy (to put
it in those terms) of reconstructing reality in form of hypothesis-building and inquiry
on the other. Doubting, self-criticism and self-reproach are the starting points to signal
that  something is  wrong.  But  then the  formation of  hypothesis  and inquiry  starts,
which Peirce famously coins as abduction, the reasonable guessing of something new.
What happens between doubting (or self-reproach) and abduction? The intermediate
stage is missing. 
38 Peirce’s  negative model  of  the self  is  strangely unconnected to its  aspiration to an
aesthetic ideal, which almost sounds platonic. While self-control is “purely inhibitory
[…] and originates nothing” (CP: 5.194), suddenly the ascent of self-control from one
higher step to another, leads to a surrender to first moral, then aesthetic ideals. “When
a man trains himself, thus controlling control, he must have some moral rule in view,
however special and irrational it may be. But next he may undertake to improve this
rule; that is, to exercise a control over his control of control. To do this he must have in
view  something  higher  than  an  irrational  rule.  He  must  have  some  sort  of  moral
principle. This, in turn, must be controlled by reference to an esthetic ideal of what is
fine.”  (CP:  5.533).  And  this  aesthetic  ideal,  “by  modifying  the  rules  of  self-control
modifies action, and so experience too – both the man’s own and that of others, and
this  centrifugal  movement  thus  rebounds  in  a  new centripetal  movement,  without
limit.” It leads even to “self-surrender” (CP: 5.402, n. 2; Colapietro 2006: 201).
39 Usually,  in  pragmatism doubting is  being conceived as  a  disturbing,  uncomfortable
state. To not only get a grip of the violent blind spots (are those really blind spots?) but
also to enable the emergence of the new, another notion of the self, another notion of
doubting is necessary, unfolding the intermediate ground between self-reproach and
certainty. Now, abduction is for Peirce the “only” operation that “introduces any new
idea” (CP: 5.171). It as a process of following a hunch without yet having a rule for it,
the rule later being established in scientific inquiry. It also is related to Peirce’s notion
of musement, a free and unconstrained pondering over an idea, “pure play” (CP: 6.458).
As is well known, in this Peirce has been inspired by Schiller’s aesthetic and his concept
of play (Deuser in: Peirce 1995: 519). Musement helps in drafting new hypotheses, it
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exceeds  the  routine  of  habits.  But  again:  What  happens  between doubting  and
abduction/musement?  The  structure  of  doubting  which  is  needed  to  overcome the
methods of  authority and a priori (including the danger of false self-certainty) can be
described  as  anti-authoritarian  doubting for  those  being  marginalized  and  as
acknowledging doubting for those privileged within a society. 
40 However,  another  form  of  doubting  is  required  for  the  scientific  inquiry  Peirce
champions. I propose to call it imaginative doubting. It is necessary because the scientific
community  neither  is  free  of  authoritarian  nor  of  priori  (in  the  Peircian  sense)
elements. It is a politically highly contested site, not at all neutral, only one example
being politics deciding which research receives funding or not, another one being what
is  considered  reasonable  or  not  depending  on  the  current  common  sense.  Who  is
considered apt to become part of the scientific community is as well highly biased and
contested (just  take a  look at  the statistics  of  the  percentage of  female  professors,
particularly  in  Germany).  Now,  how  can  you  criticize  and  overcome  that  common
sense, when it is invisible to us, being naturalized, seeming neutral and self-evident? Of
course, some structures aren’t invisible, many people simply are not willing to cede a
portion  of  their  own  power  to  others.  However,  some,  although  few,  are.  These
structures sometimes are difficult to grasp, as they are vague, and that vagueness is
fortified by the indifference of self-certainty. But, strictly speaking, it is impossible and
unrealistic to  separate  the  methods  of  authority,  a  priori,  and  science,  as  the  latter  is
permeated by the formers. To overcome and disrupt those structures, and at once to
develop  new  and  better  perspectives  –  in  scientific  and  in  political  terms –  it  is
indispensable  to  endure exactly  that  phase  in  which  doubting  and  abduction  meet,
which in Peirce seems to be a grey area. Although one should rather speak of a very
colorful area,  because this is  where the aesthetic and the play join in the doubting
(Salaverría 2012, 2017).  This meeting area is what I  describe as imaginative doubting.
Depending on your  position in  society,  it  will  be  mixed with acknowledging  or anti-
authoritarian doubts. But, most importantly, it is not a phase or state too easily done
away with.  Some studies sustain that  view,  emphasizing that “doubt engenders the
potential  of  theorizing  creatively  by  motivating  abduction’s  search  for  possible
explanations to an experienced anomaly” (Locke, Golden-Biddle & Feldman 2008: 908).
These investigators prove with several empirical examples that the generating of new
thinking in science often correlates with endured phases of doubting and uncertainty.
They describe “three reactions to experiencing doubt: (1) Ignore doubt or dismiss it as
unimportant;  (2)  turn  it  into  self-doubt  –  there’s  something  wrong with  me;  there
something wrong with my project; (3) engage it, explore it, use it” (ibid.: 911). It is the
third aspect, which is mainly underrated. As they underscore, doubting “requires, in
part, the ability to turn toward or embrace not knowing.” Even in science, pressure
exists to deliver positive results. But processing new, with Thomas Kuhn, paradigm-
changing discoveries/inventions, takes time. Therefore, we “have to unlearn how we
typically respond to doubt” (ibid.: 911f.). It is necessary to recognize the “constraints of
our  interaction  with  the  world.”  Thus,  “the  practice  of  nurturing  hunches  is  an
important way to foster musing” (ibid.: 914). As the examples of their empirical studies
show, “doubt has information value.” All of the researchers they investigated
“responded by turning toward, rather than away from, not knowing, and toward the
situations that engendered it, and they each gained important information as a result”
(ibid.: 913). It then becomes more probable to leave behind old belief-habits. Exploring
new paths “requires, in part, our willingness to disrupt belief, represented as the
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prevailing order” and to “worry less about making or trying to avoid mistakes” (ibid.:
914f.).  Instead  of  “closing  down  doubt” it  is  therefore  necessary  to  “make  doubt
generative.” And, for that, it is necessary both to disrupt the given order and to “court
doubt”  (ibid.:  915,  916).  They  give  a  good  practical  example:  Just  consider  “the
colleagues who listen to us compared to those who shut down discussion by dismissing
our  ideas.”  Science  institutions  still  tend  to  “overemphasize  validation  and  the
avoidance  of  mistakes.”  They  tend  to  maintain  the  given  common  sense  and
accompanying  self-certainty.  To  overcome  that,  it  is  crucial  to  “continue  to  court
doubt; continuing to ponder, nurture our hunches, and to avoid premature closure”
(ibid.: 916). The goal of abductive reasoning should be to “soothe” the doubt “rather
than ‘destroy,’ for an abductive hypothesis has to be put to test before converting itself
into a fixed belief” (Atocha 2015: 148). In the German discussion of the topic, Uwe Wirth
has outlined, as Vera Saller underscores, that “abduction is not any longer surprising if
we become aware, that what we do is changing the contextual frame. Hence, ‘reasoning
backwards’ aims at discovering either a singular cause or a general rule, which has to
be selected or invented.  In this  sense abduction is  the process of  ‘context sensitive
code-selection’.” (Wirth 2005: 203; Saller 2016: 187).
41 This is similar to what Rancière has in mind, when he outlines that the “political” is
inseparable from aesthetics (Salaverría, 2014, 2017). The political Rancière speaks of
points at crucial moments of public disruption, empowerment and change for people
beforehand excluded,  in difference to what he calls  police  (the settled institutional
political practices), namely, in the sense that the given context, in Peirce’s sense the
common sense, is being thwarted. You cannot criticize and change the rules of chess
within the chess game. Likewise you cannot criticize the common sense within its given
implicit rules. And, as importantly, you need to become permeable to perceive those
parts of the world which previously had been almost imperceptible to you. You will
never  learn  to  see  them  through  self-reproach  or  through  merely  uncomfortable
doubts.  Neither  will  you  lean  to  see  them  through  detached  musement.  There  is
struggle and conflict in unlearning your old habits, in dehabitualizing, at the same time
it is a form of “transformative inventive critique” (Sonderegger 2019: 137). There is an
important  component  of  dissent,  precisely  in  the  sense  of  disagreeing  with  former
beliefs-habits of yourself and of others. The musement Peirce speaks of is much too
harmonious to take this into account. The necessary disidentification from old belief-
habits, and for that matter, from your older version of the self, entails a moment of
suspension of identity, particularly of self-certainty. Loosely speaking with Kant’s Third
Critique, this means leaving the security of taken for granted criteria behind in search
for a new calibration, which makes the beforehand imperceptible criteria (we usually
think and judge with) experienceable, thereby malleable (Salaverría 2017: 177ff.). But,
contra Rancière for whom those political  moments of disidentification are rare and
exceptional, and contra Kant who conceives of aesthetic judgements as too detached
from acting and struggling bodies, I propose to think of imaginative doubting as part of
a  critical common  sense  formed  against  the  dominant  common  sense.  Imaginative
doubting is essential not only for those participating in investigative activities, be it
philosophy, other sciences, or art. It is also crucial for political fights such as the BLM or
the  Me  Too movement,  as  they  make  the  vague  taken  for  granted  common  sense
certainties not only questionable but also graspable. Apart from claiming their rights,
they also do the work of “return to sender,” by laying out in which ways the common
sense, holding on to an alleged universalism, is not staying true to its principles. But, to
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do  that  work  (which  really  should  be  done  by  those  benefitting  from  false  self-
certainties), the frame of what counts as real and as unreal, as worthy of contestation
and not, has to be redefined; the frame of perception needs to be opened up, through
imaginative doubts, which are developed, fought for, and lived through in the exchange
within critical  communities  of  activists,  artists,  writers,  philosophers,  not  by single
individuals.  And maybe this is something we can learn from the Corona Crisis:  that
unshakable  certainties  are  much more  malleable  than  we  thought,  and  that  it  is
possible to transform that insight into a good thing, into a good doubt.
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NOTES
1. “The indifference toward the suffering of refugees at the EU’s borders,  or rather the EU’s
exercise of its ‘power to make live and let die […]’ fits well with the logic of disaster nationalism
that the hollow rhetoric of solidarity barely manages to disguise: every state is on its own, the
virus is ‘othered’ as a foreign threat […] or ‘invasion,’ and the closing of borders intensifies the
‘border spectacle’ […] that is supposed to assure citizens that their government has everything
under control.” (Celikates 2020).
2. Gramsci famously coined the concept of cultural hegemony in conjunction with common sense
from which he differentiates another – potentially critical form – of common sense, disclosing
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some  parallels  to  pragmatist  philosophy,  particularly  Dewey’s  (notwithstanding  Gramsci’s
polemic rejection of pragmatism “as only contributing to a Rotary Club movement”). As Brendan
Hogan puts it, both “converge in proffering a vision that registers the hegemonic character of
‘forms of life’  at  a level  basic to any understanding of human philosophical  anthropology or
human agency.” For a comparison of John Dewey and Gramsci on this issue see Hogan (2015: 108);
Gramsci (1971: 373), cited in Hogan (ibid.).
3. Sonderegger (2019); another postmarxist approach with pragmatist elements is being pursued
by Jaeggi (2018).
4. For the fluent transition between instincts and habits and their relation to Peirce’s notion of
common sense, see Boyd & Heney (2017).
5. For a highly detailed semiotic-theologian discussion of certainty, see Linde (2013).
6. For a semiotic discussion of this problem see Pape (1998).
7. Online: [https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/].
8. Alfred S. Silver draws a parallel between psychoanalytic terms of transference and projection
in Freud, Klein and Peirce in Silver (1993: 382-402; particularly 400). 
ABSTRACTS
The tension between the need for critique and its (often unperceived) limits through our given
common sense, a tension Charles S.  Peirce describes as critical common sense, hasn’t lost its
actuality. Vague certainty is one root of this tension, which the paper unfolds by distinguishing
two forms: while the first one grounds common sense as a form of life, the second one, self-
certainty, represents the purpose of endeavors, and it serves, speaking with Pierre Bourdieu, as a
form of distinction (1). As part of an indifference towards power structures of exclusion, vague
certainties contribute to what Judith Butlers describes as the violent derealization of  others,
which  is  being  discussed  in  the  light  of  the  Black  Lives  Matter and  Me  Too movement.
(Self-)certainty, as is being shown, is not (merely) an epistemological matter, but encompasses
the fields of the political and aesthetic. Accordingly, as a crucial part of political critique and
practices  to  counter  (self-)certainties,  a  differentiation  of  doubting  is  required  –  the  paper
proposes four different kinds: authoritarian, anti-authoritarian, acknowledging and imaginative
doubting.  They  help  understand  the  political  struggles  of  re-realizing  formerly  derealized
positions  within  society  (2).  Particularly  through  imaginative  doubting,  some  shortcomings
within Peirce’s notion of the self (and, for that matter, within the pragmatist notion of doubting)
are being overcome by showing how to link it to creative processes of abduction, which in turn
have  consequences  for  political  matters  by  unsettling  implicit  consent,  or,  in  the  words  of
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